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THESIS: The dominating role of the Krupp armament industry 
in all levels of German life ir: the twentieth century provided 
a leading cause for German entrance into two vmrld wars. Res-
toration of power of the Krupp industries since the vrn:r' s end 
symbolizes the resurrection of Germany ES a force potent in 
world affairs. Will this Kruppian reign return Germany to 
militarism? 
"Militarism is a form of civilization and a state of mind. 
It presses for stronger armar_ents and accustoms the ordinary 
citizens to the idea that weapons alone can settle a strife of 
yeo iiles. n Adherents to this philosophy are found in German mil-
tary policy and administration of the late lJinteent:1 and eE.rly 
twentieth centuries. The creed of rnilitarisn includes five-
a"t'ticlcs: privilege ls ::i.n a0.v1.nt:1:seti 'n.)8l"'ialism); might makes 
right(materialism); war is desirable; war is inevitable(fatal-
1 
ism); states are n2.tural enemier. (n2tion2~lisn) • This creed of 
militQrism was accepted by three important leaders of German 
civilization: Industry, Gove:;:·nm8nt, and t~1e Arm:' Criiefs of Stdf. 
Industry is re presented by the House of Krup p . In 1587 
the first Krupp appeared and became the r~chest citizen of 
Essen as an iron merchant. Since then the House of Krupp has 
played a significant role in making or destroying German poli-
tical leaders. vin 1811 Fred.rich Krupp (1787-1826) opened a_ vvark-
shop for casting steel and thus helped the Prussians defeat 
Napolean. From 1859-70 Alfred Krupp(l812-87) aided Bismarck 
against Austria~ Russia and France. The saga of the Krupps 
-
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is one of intrigue and lust for poiver. It is a " story of an econ-
omic empire which survived depressions, military def re ts and 
foreign occupation. It is a tale of materialistic, unscrupulous 
but able men, who engaged in selling weapons to all nations 
and who helped exacerbate one diplomatic crisis after another. 
Part I delves into the manipulations of the Hous:3of Krupp 
in starting a .vicious, competitive armament trade to enemy 
nations before World War I. Norbert Muhlen concentrates on 
how the Krupps promoted naval armaLents for Germany, then sold 
these arms abroad. Bernhard Menne demonstrates how Krupp am-
bassadors had a "hot line" on all diplomatic develop~nt.s in 
arms trade through key government personnel. A second area for 
discussion is Imperial Government, or the 1"eans used by Wilhelm II 
to secure favorable domestic and foreign contracts for Krupp. 
Arthur Rosenburg, as a reporter for the Reichstag Comnission of 
1931, saw in the Kaiser's decisions an attempt to enhance his 
role of a ruler who is above all power; whose show of might was 
right. Tli.is Treitschke principle, Karl Novrark emphasizes, was 
utilized by Wilhelm in Morrocan and Balkan crises, :in his 
support of Krupp arms trade. In a third sphere the Army Chiefs 
of Staff promoted the desirability and inevitability of war. 
Gerhard Ritter researched the Schlieffen papers to pro duce an,, 
analysis of this general's nationalistic motives for German 
Li ilitarism. Walter Goelitz, a German historian, considered 
Walder see' s theories and the younger von Moltke' s paS3i ve role 
amidst the rising tide of militarism. The parts played by 
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these three sectors in German militarism caused incrre sed 
tensions in European affairs and subsequent reasons for the 
First World War. 
Part II enumerates the role of the House of Krupp in 
correlating the creed of militarism and World War II. Peter 
Batty and Norbert Muhlen describe _th~ imperialistic ends 
(article I of the creed) of Krupp rearmament between·the wars. 
Walter Goelitz enumerates situations in which the Chiefs of 
Staff become involved in the testing procedures for national-
istic motives. The authors discuss Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 
und Halbach(l870-1950) in his support of Hitler for politico-
economic reasons. Leslie Simon who expresses the inner rationale 
of the people and Krupp's response to Hitler's cries: might 
makes right, war is desirable, war is inevitable, states axe 
natural enemies. The destruction of Krupp and Allied help 
in rebuilding is shown by Muhlen to be an attempt to Eliminate 
the creed of militarism. Berthold Beitzts reconstruction of 
the House in the 1q501s seemed to keynote the end to an era .. 
In Part III this student of history analyizes the situa-
tion pro and con: will Germany under the House of Krupp econ-
omic impact resurrect the creed of militarism? 
PE.rt I Making .~he V{orld Open its Eyes 
The new Kaiser of 1888, Wilhem II, promoted Germany in 
foreign affairs by placing government cor.tracts 1i;i th lm.er lead-
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ing armorer and industry, the House of Krupp. With govern-
ment loans Fritz Krupp(l854-1902) was able to expan~ his 
plant area. By corporation brigandage and stock excl:ange 
pit'racy /ne bought up coal mines in Germany, the French Lor-
r 
raine, Lu,gembourg and iron ore fields in Spain and Sweden. He 
r;tt.•'V'.,., il-'--
acquired the rivar· Gruson arms factory by secretly buying 
shares until 1892. Not only did he secure favorable ~urces 
of raw materials, but Krupp secured patents for the newest 
methods of arms production . Through well placed contacts, he 
had advance knowledge of the Bessemer process. This p ut Krupp 
on a steel prod.uction level ,:: qual to England. He bought the 
license for gunpowder from Alfred Nobel and became the first 
firm on the continent in the .producLion of anrnunition. By 1893 
Krupp held the patent for nickel steel alloy and established 
the first armor plate mill on the continent. 
These accomplishments were but a beginning.nrt was not 
in the interes ts of the firm to perfect an armor which would 
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make shells useless". Ther efore the Krupp spent the next 20 
years researching new missiles to pierce the armor. And with 
each of these development car1-e huge or<iers. Despite the pro-
tests of Reichstag leaders .Krup.1: complained, 11 We can not live 
from Prussia alone; when foreign states place orders, I can 
not supply bad stuff to them. 11 As a result the Essen concern 
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soon became a barometer indic&ting the pressures of the in-
ternE,tional arms race. ; "Scruples never troubled the Krupps~' 
says Mlthlen, as they sold 24,000 gun~ to Germany before World 
4 
War I and 26,000 to 50 other nations. So went the artillery 
trade. 
In the meantime Bismarck vms dismissed(l891) and Wil-
helm II no longer met Nith ministerial objection to his cam-
paign for Germany's future on the seas. One of his friends, 
Fritz Krupp, had been financing the Navy League s ince 1898 
to promote the Kaiserts interest in naval armament. The 
League's monthly publication told the educated middle class 
about future German supre. acy; and told the working class of 
increased employment from the proposed shipyards. The Navy 
League wa s a hit securing a membership of a million. It was 
divided into 5000 local branches and included prominent ~ov- . 
- - 1.. ,,·. i .i '} ~{✓ r' . \.;,-... -,,., .. ,... (. 
ernment ~inisters. As a result of the extens ive base the 
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Reichstag passed three ~avy Acts(l898,1900,1906). 
In 1902 Krupp had secretly acquired the Germania ship-
yards at Kiel,after buying up shares through undercover 
agents ' • 'iNhen the Kaiser vms ready to designate a firm to 
build an extensive German f leel,, the House was ready under 
its new leaders. Bertha Krupp(l886-1957) and her husband 
Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach Krupp (1870-1950) took over 
when Fritz died in 1902. They built the first German sub-
marine in 1906 and produced nfne up to 1Sl4. The firm also 
proc"i.uced the decisive weapons of the pre-war raceJ dread-
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noughts. They were battleships vii th ten 12" guns and .24 
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quickfire guns to match th,J British. Furthermore, the Krupc s 
became the only private German shipyard to build eveY."-J fu-
ture class - battleships , cruisers, destroyers, subs. All 
this activity in the Navy Era was promoted by Krupp and his 
friend Admiral Tirpitz. This led to increas ed in not only 
German demands but foreign orders as well. After gropping 
among mountains of papers,Bernhard Menne found that Krupp 
offered his armor plate to the ship builders of Britain and 
France. The profits the firm accrued from this new area of 
trade are discernible in the figures of Krupp's personal 
fortune which amo½ted to 200 million marks after 1900. At the 
,.l 
same time the Krupp firm became Europe ' s largest industrial 
combine v:i th a total property value of 3QOmillion marks and 
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with annual profits of wellover 25 million marks. 
,}N)t 
Krupp played an important role in trad~ led to leader-
ship in policy making. According to the 1871 Constitution 
final decisions in ali such political matters rested in the 
hands of the Emperor. In domestic affairs the Imperial Cabinet 
was res~nsible to the Emperor as was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. But 7iilhelmI, quips Professor Rosenberg of Berlin) 
was far from Bismarckian statesman who could r• juggle coun-
8 
tries'interests abroad". Firms v1ith overseas investments 
pressurized the Emperor to provide protection and favors. 
Krupp vri th great amounts of su_ plus capital found backward 
parts of the globe easiest to place loans. Easy prey were 
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the Far East, Nor th Africa 2.nd the Balkans ._,,"i tl✓cheir natural 
resources, cheap labor, markets, corrupt and inefficent gov-
s 
ernments. If German nationals or Krupp property were en-
dangered, the dignity of the .nation dem::tnded defense of 
the rishts of citizens. To ensure this support, Krupp re-
tained imperial f c--.vor by equiping the navy and army which 
defended these interests . 
Bernhard Menne notes the Imperial Gov<:-;rnment was now 
a pledged proponent of Krupp militarism in the Far East, 
i 
Morocco and -che Balkans. For example, in the Russo-Japanese ,, 
War of 1904, Krupp comp~eted torpedo craft and subs despite 
Germany's declaraticn of neutrality. Britain protested. •Did 
the Kaiser take ap)ropriate action? Vli thin t1iventy-four ·hours 
after an outcry in the British press against the KrUll»s, the 
Kaiser released the ships . The trusted Admiral Barandon, a 
former director of the Krupp f irm,assured Wilhelm they were 
undoubtedly pleasure yachts, al tbo ·_Lgh they bore inscr.iptions 
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liAe "tor pedo room". The Emperor was used effectively to 
attain militaristic goals vlhile arousing the mistrust of 
England. 
Krupp and the Kaiser next created a new arena of crisis. 
From 1906 the firm w2s engaged in the rearming of Hussia, a 
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process which was not completrad until August, 1914. Krupp's. 
response to Russian r~ubles allowed every g; sold helAhat 
nation enclose Germ&nyts Eastern Front. 
Morocco is another troub;Le spot synonomous with Krupp. 
7 
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Morocco was a valuable duruping ground for obsolete arms as 
well as an area with rich deposits of h....ematite ore necessary 
for production of ord~ ce steel. From 1904-5 the F1~nch firm 
Schneider sought a share in th·::: market. France's Del casse 
"offered Germany the port of Casablanca and financial support 
for the Bagdad Railway" for this share. Chief of Staff von 
Schlieffen opposed the attempt for economic markets. It was 
a slear sign France was down and it was time: 
France should be provoKed until she had no 
course but arms. If the French will not 
give way, let them come at us. They will 
run straight into our guns. 
Wilhelm listened. With his well- advertised.landing at Tunis 
he sacrificed GBrman friendship with France to serve ·the mil-
itarism of an ..Lndividual firm. It was at this point that 
France decided to abandon antagonism toward Britain and 
conclude ah Entente against Germany. Later in 1911 another 
Moroc can crisis occured in which Krupp forced the French com-
petitors to their knees and secured a Moroccan contrac:,t for 
12 
145,000 tons of raw steel per year. 
Next one finds trouble s:)ots in the Balkans. Germany 
'· 
did not renew the alliance with Russia,because of Krui>p arm-
/. 
ament contracts in Turkey. Fortification of the TurY.ish 
frontier with Kruppturrets proved interfering ~o Russia 's 
di signs on the Straits . Krupp in the meantime sold the TU.rks 
obsole~arrns at 165,000 marks, although the cost was 14,000 
13 
a piece . 
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In the 1912-3 Balkan wars
1 
the firm was again on top. 
Krupp 's supply of outdated arms left Turkey defeated . "Yet 
Krupp's participation in the Powder 'I'rust made large quanti-
ties of German explosives available to nations oppose:1 to 
Turkey- through Parisian centers." Thus the second aet of 
the Balkan drama saw Krupp aiding Hungary, while his Aus-
trian arms subsidary, Skoda, was supplying Bulgaria 2nd her 
opponents J 11 Confusion among various interests in the Balkans 
14 
was Babelian in character i1 These were the commercial machin-
ations which set the stage for early twentieth century poli ti-
cal struggles. 
On the eve of war statistics of the Essen firm show 18 
plants and 1000 ore mines in spots all over Germany. They 
used mqre elect~icity than the whole of Berlin; the length 
of railroad lines inside the works would have connected 
Frankfurt and Munich; their telegraphlines vmuld have reached 
from Strassburg to Konigsberg. The industry had become an 
empire usin?; its power to manipulate domestic and foreign 
ventures. Particularly in this second area Krupp attained 
world f&.me. He was dtrector of the Harvey United Steel Com-
1-,any from 1901-12. The organization included: 
German firms: Krupp 47000 shares 
Dillingen 3700 shares 
Austrian firm J : Skoda 
British firms : Armstrong Vickers 2700 shares 
John Brown 7400 shares 
French firms : Schneider 9800 shares 
American firm::,: Bethlehem Steel 4300 shares 
I 
The policy of this War Trust or Arms Ring was to draw royalties 
9 
from all nations rather than cutthroat competition among each 
other. Their aim,as discussed in their publication, Arms and 
Explos.1.ves, wasnto preserve universal peace by arming all 
nations with destructive weapons so that none would dare go 
to war" . It became customary for any improvement in Krupp or-
nance metal or des ign to be passed around to the other 2.rmament 
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@ with customary royalties. In a vmrd, the Krupp firm 
became the pulse of international affairs. 
The third sector of German civilization which allied v..it h 
Krupp to prolliote militarism was the Prussian Army . This staie 
within the State was commanded by the Kaiser through the 
Chiefs of Staff. Both V.'alderseee and von Schlieffen "advocated 
war as desirable and inevitable, on the basis of Heinrich van 
Treitschkets declaration : 
T' e moral majestyof war increases the virility 
and courage of a .1a tion; it weaves a bond of 
love between her men. 16 
To them the nature of man makes war inevitable;states are 
natural enemies. Walde:usee as Chief of Staff(l888 .... 91) believed 
a Franco-German war v1as in the making andprepared an offen-
sive against Russian invasioL called npreventi ti ve w;;..r n. :More 
important he convinced Wilhelm 11 , contends Vial ter Goerlitz of 
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"the necessity of readying military appartus. Von Schlieffm 
worked as ChiGf of Staff(l89l-1905) creating a plan for en-
circlement. Gerhard Ritter com11ents: 
The strategy was broad but shallow. He seems 
to have regarded the offensive against France 
as a geographical matter to be accomplished by 
a superior, c:,rmed German mili t&.ry machine 18 
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Then v,rhy aid 0he Chief , of Staff fail to intiate arm-
ament reform? The French General Staff had introduced the 
75 mm recoiling field gun, ballistically superior to anything 
the German_rproduced . The French had military aviation units 
and the armored car . Berlin hesitated . When three experi-
mental types of aGr, ed cars equ..1.p,::ied -,;i th machine guns ap-
peared at the 1908 Austro-German maneuvers , "no body ru:L d the 
least idea v..-hat to do with them" . Lt . Col. Burstyn _of the Aus-
trian rail troops offered the War Ministry in 1911 , and ar-
machine gun-carrying vehicle with catepillar treads . "This 
prototype of the tank,writes Goerlitz,wasnnot found worth 
19 
carrying beyond the experimental stage 11 • The backstairs in-
fluence on these decisions was the Krupps. They did not own 
the patents nor did they see the value of purchasing the 
rights. Wilhelm II stood by the decison of his foremost 
armament manufacturer. Chief of Staff von Moltke(l905-14) 
had little to say in regards to weaponry. These questions wem 
decid.ed by War Minister Falkenhayn, who was stronzly .influew ed 
by Krupp as._ociat~s . 
' · The complex maneuvers used-- by Krupp to achieve his con-
trol of · government and army remains to be shown. By 1895 gov-
ernment departmBnts and Krupp concerns were interlocking . Gov-
ernment officials were affiliated with the firm in various wqgs : 
On the Krupp Companyrs(private limited liability 
f~ Board of Directors were the Minister of Rail-
w&ys, von Thielen and the Kaiser's naval expert, 
Admiral Barandon. 
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For instance the Admiral used his influence to have the NaV'J 
Bureau require would be contractors to ,provide artillery ranges 
for testing. This was beyond the resources of new or smaller 
firms and the House retained a virtual monopoly. Menre found 
in his research countless other examples: 
The Minister of L_abor, Budde, was a former dir-
ector of a Krupp munitions work . Secretary of 
State's brother was employed by Krup~ as was 
future Imperial Chancellor, ByJ._ow. So was the 
~ of the President of the 0t.Qpance Board, who 
~ tted arms contracts. 
~ ) 
Hundreds of army people W€re simultaneo~ y employed in Essen 
to oversee tests of ordnance. And the role of Krupp e:ivoys 
abroad could fill several pa ges. He placed agents in German 
Embassies to secure innumerable tips on foreign arms p~chased 
b<J diplomats. Finally, Krupp made personal friendships with 
men necessary instruments to his end. Among his frecµent 
20 
guest for dinner was noneother than a stockholder, Vvilhelm II. 
In 1900 the relationships B.nd jobbery came out during 
the proceedings of the Budget Commission. For one o-t/the few 
times in its career the Essen firm underwent a Parliamentary 
investigation. It was discovered that Krupp had profiteered 
in armor plate andwrung an annual sum of 3 million marks from 
the State . He was charging the State one miliion m&rks f 
per battleship although the costs of )roductio1 vvere far les~. 
Admiral Tirpitz viewed Krupp's moves as betrayal of their 
friendhip and supported the Left in the Reichstag to ~ring 
charges against the Krupp firm . But representative~ were 
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pow er less in face of a government dominated by · the Emperor 
and his retinue . These men not parliament awarded the fat 
contracts and likev:ise controlled the purse strings. As the 
historian Hallgarten found after years of research in German 
State Records, "The entire goverrunent became Krupp agencies. n 
After the scandal died down Krup~ continued his promo-
tion of militarism. The Defence Associat~on, a pan-German 
group p!l:'oposing a huge army an a war of agression, w2.s sup-
ported by Krupp through newspaper advertisements. In 1909 
the Union of Industrialists, whose President was a Krupp di-
rector, ·worked to inspire"patriotic"electors of the Reich-
stag. The firm financed a pseudo-scientific association 
under Krupp director Klufpel, which set u p professors of na-
tionalistic ad.our at the universities. Krupp acquired con-
tolling interest of Wolff, the official telegraph bureau as 
a mouthpi ece for Essen. He s et up editorial offices of .news-
papers in thousands of towns abroad. The headquarters for 
this operation was the Intelligence Office. They collected 
informati.04relating to armaments which appeared in foreign 
news. They made use of the agents to secure by bribery and 
21 
espionage the latest drawings of ships and arms. 
In the course of this discussion on Germ&n militarism the 
relations between industry, goverqment and army were evident. 
Family friendshi p was used for ordndance contfacts. Steel wa s 
then sold to the enPmy irres :;. ective of German nationalistic 
considerations. Business transactions and rivalries in arma-
13 
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ments became a ca.use and ~ ct of one another. Granted the 
Krupps were but one of the Europe:an firms cavor ting amidst 
the profits accrued during imperialistic ventures. Neverthe-
less, the Krupp's percentage of total arms trade demonstrates 
their important rol1C; in provoking competition. The difficul if 
in striking an equilibrium led to a heightened creed .o f mil-
itarism. 
The Krupp's through their interlocking directorates 
among the navy, army, rail department, cu.Lmunications and 
transportation bureaus influenced the workings of the entire 
German °tate. The various plants "l so hired close to a 
100,000 workers. But the foremost pocket of power, the Kaisa:r 
threw the balance to Krupp's favor. As a result he received 
a slice of every armar.ent order prior to 1914. Had he man-
ufactured the quality recoiling gun instead of immense. quanti-
ties of heavy outdated artille~, Germany's treasury would 
J 
have been put to good use. As it was the House of Krup~ 
gcbbled much of Germany 1s financial and natural wealth, in-
volved the Kaiser and Chiefs of Staff in foreign policy crises, 
and aroussd international tension. The creed of mi-litarism 
vvhich motivated the arms race led Germany down the road to 
ruin of World War I. 
14 
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' \ / Part II Never t ·o Rise Again? , 
According to the Versailles Treaty Germany was to have 
no defense forces,except an army of 100,000and a token fleet 
of 15,000 sailors. Under Allied supervision workers of Krupp 
dismantled and destroyed 9000 machines, 800,000 tools and 
22,000 cubic meters of masonry which had been used toprp~uce 
,£,.,,,.,-ci.-. 
weapons. Krupp was forced to produce tools of peace as movie 
"' 
projectors, textiles, cash registers, typewriters, motor 
scooters. Stainless steel r:hich Krupp developed during the 
22 
war was the only field in which he gained profit. Even this 
would not have been possible without the help of outsiie forcES. 
T-he German Govern.u.ent prov _;_ded subsidies as restitution for 
damages suffered in the war, for weapon orders never paid for, 
for damages suffered during the Rubr- invasion. The Reich felt, 
"As Itrupp goes so goes Germany 11 • As a result, Chancellor 
Joseph Wirth ~ Gustav in 1921, telling oft1sums to b~ re-
leased to the firm to preserve German technology and lay new 
foundations for Germany I s progress in weapons". The firm re-
23 
ceived 15 million toward this end. 
K.....rupp was also compensated by Britain for its wartime 
lease of patents on shell fuses to the Vickers arms trust. 
Since Britain had used hundreds of these fuses again;:t Ger-
man troops during the war, Krupp asked for 6 million. Ase-
cret arrangement was readied whereby "Krupp received his pay 
for the bullets which killed his countrymen". The United States 
helped by granting Krupp credits of 12 million in 1925 to 





it through the 1920Ts when other firms crashed. 
For Krupp was investing these sums in i terns n:ore pro-
fitable than tools of peace. Like most other Germans he con-
~" 7 
sidered one-s ided the disarman .ent of tmr:i..r country. It was 
Sriyv"t 
not only an injustice but a danger to peace. For staiB s are 
A 
natural enemies, said Krupp, and a defenseless Germany could 
easily invite at'ession from neighbors. Therefore/ the way co 
make the new Ger .. any secure was through might- ,arms produc-
tion which at ths same time would make a profit . 
Gustav saw three loo pholes in the Versailles Treaty: it 
did not prohibit Germany from blueprinting new weapons or con-
structing them on a draftboard ; nor could the treaty fore-
stall production of vehicles which could be easily transformed 
into t anks; it said nothing about ({erman f1rms producing arms 
outs ide of the country. Gustav tells how he violated VersailJes 
in an article"Plant Leaders and Armament Workers'~ ·;;hich appeared 
in his firm 's house magazine for 1 filarch 1942. As earJy- as 1919 
while the victors were squabbling, Gustav set up an information 
department in Essen ar:darranged for tech~l ological and military 
publications from all over the world to be sent thera In this 
way he kept abreast of the latest developments. In 1922 the 
Reichswehr signed a contract with Krup p to develop future Ger-
man ar til~ery on the draftbo ards . 
Thus to the surprise of many, we began to manfac-
ture :products ·,,h~ch ap~•eared to be f ar distant 
from arma:..i.ents. Even the Allied s nooping commis-
sions were auped . Padlocks, milk cans, cash re-
gisters,locomotives and automobiles made a nctvil-
ian"impression. 25 
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Krupp also took ac1.vantat: e of the third loophole .Arma-
rr:.ent achievements abroad c.re recorded in memor&nda of the 
firm's business files. One panphlet, TtThe Artillery Construction 
Department of Fried Krupp A.G. and the Development of Arr..y 
17 
J\..rtillery from 1918 to 1933n, goes into painstaking detail of (" irvrTu_;,.2.,J 
~~e ~ 
operations in Sweden, Holland and Spain. (1,-.,J .. :;i.<4>1 ~% :,·~ .. ~ {\,\ { 11,V • 
)( "" ' - , , • i .;', V ,,.I 
Before the signature of Germany was on the Versailles 
Treaty Krupp had made contracts to deliver guns to Holland 
J . 
and South .American @tates. Thanks to connections with the 
Swedish Bofors firm he was able to make delivery. In 1918 
he had bought his way into the Arms Factory by selling them 
his patents, blueprints and secret processes.Bofors and the 
silent Essen partner manufactured cannons as early as 1920. 
They included the 7.5 cm mountain gun which was tested in the 
Spanish Civil War by the German government. By 1925 Krupp 
owned 6 millionofl9 million shares and had established a core 
of technicians who could r eadily be transferred to Essen. 
When the Swedish government saw f~t tb close down the estab-
26 
lishment in 1935, K.rup+ ad what he needed. 
While Krupp developed army artillery in Sweden he was 
using two border countries for other purposes. In Switzerland • 
his undercover firm tested an anti-aircraft gun. HolJand also • 
was easy prey. Here the most valuable work was completed be-
cause of the free flow of goods and personnel, and the com-
\,.. 
pliance of Dutch businessmen. Francet~ied as early as 1926 • 
to ask the Dutch government to prohibit firms financial in-..__, 
volvementwiththe Krupps . The projects, as revealed b.fdocuments 
captured at Essen in 1945, show that Krup -vrns keeping not 
only the Allies in the dark, but the Germans as well. Serv.Lce 
Publication No.15 Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-
1935 shows,that in 1922 a dummy Dutch company, Ingenieurskan-
toor voor Schee;)sbouw, was established by Krupp .• He moved 
his team of naval designers from Kiel to Rotterdam in order 
to "preserve anc. develop· Ger 1- an U Boa ts". Models were 
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then tested and sold to Japan, •Turkey1 and Finland. 
Spain and Japan also proved usefuL Gustav bought back 
iron ore deposits at Bilbao and Cadiz. Here he began wor.1, 
on the new U boats th2t would be mas;:; produced at Kiel after 
1936. Admiral Canaris, who l;_::_ ter achieved considerable fame 
was at that time negotiating construction of subs for the 
naval service. Japan was moving closer to a German axis 
28 
with the secret Krupp treaty for making U boats. 
But the crowning victory was Krup:,,s \ dealings with Russia. 
In July 1922 after Rapallo, Gerneral von S&--eckt, head of the 
German ·National Defence Force and Dr. w~rth, German Chancellor 
conducted a second military pact between the Red and German 
Axmy. Although it was given the bogus title," Provisional 
Trade Agreement", its r8al intention was to involve German 
firms in redeveloping Russian a.nd German arms. The German • 
government provided unlimited funds to the German generals. 
for the task by creating a cover organization called, nsocietµ 
for the Encouragement of Co cercial Enterprises!!. Under this 




Meanwhile in Essen itself Krupp continued re search and 
testing under the noses of Allied ins~ectors. In July,~925, 
the firm opened a seemingly harmless machine f actory in Berlin 
under the name Koch and Kienzle. For two years the firm de-
signedahd developed nevi howitzer s , 8 typ~s of cannons, a 21 cm 
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mortar and a spr1ll.Ilg gun carriage. 
Q/ 
I o--_:fFor in 1926 the creation of Pilsudski' s mili tm;-y dict a-
t ,-rship and consequent strength of the Polish Army rmdered 
the disquiet caused by the Polish Corridor more acute Speak-
ing under oath at Nuremberg,Generals von Blomberg and Blasko-
witz,explained how officers were dominated by fear of a Polish 
invasion. The West was secured by Locarno but not the East. 
Therefore the General Staff had t aken upon itself to enlist 
the im1aedia te supiJOrt of industry . They allotted a section 
- the Economic Staff (Wirtschaftsstab), to the Weapons nepartment 
The pe rson..viel on the S;aff came fro1, various arms industries 
and their job was to 0rganize raw material centers in spots 
hidden from the Control Commission. Thus the railway depart-
ment of h.r upps was secretly engaged in artiTiery prodution , 
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although they never changed their name outwardly. 
By O-....ctober, 1928 the German Army's( Reichswehr) Weapons ____ ,. -~~., 
Department asked Krupp to deliver two experimentalTI" light 
tractors". This was the code name for tanks armed with machine"'-1 
guns, according to the prosecution :.. t Alfried rs Nuremberg Tr:ia 1 .. 
These tanks, ·;;i th the exce tion of the hydraulic safety swi t<h./ 
19 
were produced two years before the ~hsw,ehr placed their 
order. By 1936 Krupp made en original contribution by weldirg 
rather than riveting the catepillar treads, an innovation 
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reducing the weight of ths vehicle . Thus,it was said that when 
Hitler came to power, Krupp had successfully bypassed Versaille s. 
In all these endeavo~~ ~~v,rqs material ends Krupp found 
•~p (A , 
the ever present army P\ Wheh Krupp Jproduced cannons in Sweden 
officers of the Reichswehr were present at the firing ranges. 
German naval officers sat in the Dutch Krupp office and others 
gained expenience in Turkey, Finland, and Japan. Krupp had 
retained the ties he made in the era of the First World War. 
But what Krupp lacked was support from the Democrats, 
pacifists and leftists who. denounced the disarma.ent 'l.riiolations 
On the other fence were men like Adolf Hitler who's permanent 
sounding package deals seemed appealing . The Interim State 
(Zwischenreich) provided anything but a strong government. nrrl. 
--· ~=r• 
this vms a prerecJ.uisite for the grow·th of Krupp whether there 
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was war or peace. 
But Krupp did not immediately throw in his lot with HitJer. • 
the Krupps were German snobs looking at Hitler as a parvenu. 
Besides they always had b•:o en proud of their relation to the 
Old Guard Army, who were suspicious of the radicalism and • 
racialism of Hitler. Gustav's closest ties were · wi fu von ° 
Seeckt...) and von Schleicher, Vfho were decidedly aloof from the 
National Socialists. As late as the d~y before President von 
Hindenburgappointed Hitler as Chancellor, Krupp advised his 
old friend against the move~ In the meantime neither Bruning 
20 
nor von Papen brought Germany into a responsible policy. B"y 
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that time Hitler was eliminating possible rivals. 
Jn January, 1932, Hitlet was invited to the famous In-
dustrie Club in Dusseldorf by the big Ruhr magnates. By No-
vember, 1932, Hjalmar Schact, Pr~sident of the Reichabanc, was 
pleading and scheming with these industrialists in behalf of 
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·Hitler. He drafted a letter to be signed by more than 200 
German business leaders as an appeal to Hindenberg to appoint 
Hitler as his Chancellor . Gustav never attended the first 
meeting nor did he pen the petition . (A copy of the::etter 
was later foum}inj the, safe of the I .H. Stein B,2nk in Cologne 
which showed Krupp rs typewritten signature.) IJis aim had been 
to preserve the family business from possible Nazi failure. 
But in January, 1933, Hitler was ap~-ointed Reich ChanceJJor. 
He surrounded himself 'Nith conservz..tives and right wingers. He 
21. 
• 
then sought World War I fly~ng ace,Goering,to invited 20 indus- • 
trialists to hear a Hitler_ speech in February. As Hitler asked 
for financial aid for the coming general election, Gustav took 
notes. In Gustav's Private Correspondances 1933-4, the his-
torian finds his impressions . Hitler had called for sociali2~ 
ation of the big businesses excepting "the great pioneers of 
heavy industry, like Krupp". Their goals became complementary. 
While Gustav considered politics important only to give him 
a strong frame for business, Hitler regarded edonomics impor-
tant as it gave stability to political affairs. Where a-s the 
Weimar Republic was vacillating, Hitler wasnot in his aims to 
-
restore German economic dominance. · Thus the 1\.:rupp who had 
been proud of loyalty to the State transferred loyalty to 
the new Nazi state. Although he did not finance the Fuhrer's 
rise to power he certainly did nothing to prevent such a 
climb nor to help provide an alternative. He saw no chnger 
in using the Nazis to the interests of Big Business. 
After thB srleech Gustav pledged the .i."azisf150, oao to-
wards the campaign fund. Once Hitler was in firm control 
there was "no holding of his ardour for the Nazi cause.rt Wi th7 
out consulting the other .members of the Federation of German 
Industries he decreed in April, 1933, Jews would no longer 
remain in the Federation • .tie replaced the Jewish executive 
director with two Nazis. By August he issued the order in-
troducing the Hitler salute in all German fc,ctor ...... es,not Just 
his own. He became a .. super-Nazi sponsoring public meetings., 
Further he allowed 700 of his several thous,,nd employees to 
be sent to concentration camps prior to S~ptember, 1939. 
vVha t other role did Krupp take besides financial con-
tributions and political compliance? Files show that soon 
after his initial meeting with Hitler, Gustav openly shifted 
to tools of war. Ordeies came in from abroad. Once again as i n 
pre World War I days arms were openly sold to Suuth America, 
Turkey, Greece and Soviet Russia. Imperialistic ventures of 
militarism were seen in Korea and Japan>where the Krupps es-
tablished plants using gasoline to produce steel(the revoluQ 
tionary Renn Process). Tgen from 1933-5 his profits went up 
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- from 6 to 12 million. By the eve of the World Wa:r the Kiel 
shipyards were launching U baats at the rate of one a month. 
They were turning out field howitzers and heavy mortars by the 
score. Mass production was underway for the multi-purpose 88 
mm anti-aircraft cum anti-tankgun, which was to cause notori-
ety in Greece and North .Africa. From 35.,000 employees in 1932 
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there was a rise to 112,000 by 1938. A1though only 26% of 
these workers were engaged in armar:ents (4C% in. 1914), the 
House of Krupp was fast becoming the nerve center of German 
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bal1istics. 
Unlike the first war the German people were imn:ersed in 
goals of the Nazi state. They played a significant role in 
promoting militarism through their coalition with industry and 
government. Altho 0gh Hitler detracted from arms research this 
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was far from the case in regard to production. By a continual 
line of propaganda he convinced his people that each could 
engage in developments where science had left off. The Ger-
man excellence in mechanical things would triumph over the 
"victors'restrictionstT. As a result, the pocket battleship 
was produced concentrating tremendous f_ring power ; an in-
genious pistol of a caliber within~limits was manufactured; 
the outstanding sailplanes were executed. Hitler conlli. need 
people of their utility in arousing and intimidating enemy 
states. 
Krupp at the same time incited the masses to th:is 
banner. They pointed out the nation was not economically 
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self sufficent and had to im!.-'ort food:.ctuffs and raw materials. 
,Export of war mater~als was a German necess~ty in order to 
gain credits for the importation of essential supplies. This 
~b- ~b · F was ig usiness as an American auto industry. or as many 
Ainericrn firms maintain large labs for their own economic 
gain the Firmen Institute ovmed by Krup~ had large proving 
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grounds. There would seem to be one concrete difference. 
Weapons development involves a cloak of secrecy to protect 
the plans from a potential enemJ • 
In return for Krup}'s role in socio-economic realms 
the Nazi t s honored him with hundreds of prizes. The Minis-
ter of Economic made hi1 German Fuhrer of Economics, orer seven 
.. 
firms in a new economic set up, the Firmen Institute. The 
Minister of Labor gave him the title "pioneer of Labor". the • 
Minister of Armawents awarded Gustav the 11war Cross cf Meri t 11 .. 
Finally Gustav received a Golden Party Badge from Hill.er on 
his seventieth birthday. More important Hitler had his youth 
groups dutifully recite around campfires the phrase,ntough as 
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leather, q_uick as grey hol!nds, hard as Krupp steel". 
But who was the real militarist of ..:he two'r Who controlled 
the arms situa.tion-i by the Warts end Krupp ·herd learned what 
Hitler meant by his vow not to abolish private property and 
free enterprise. TTThe master in Villa Hueg: w2..s dma.n graded 
to a part time agent of the State , vvhile Hitler took or er. The 
firmt war mater-al department report of 1942 shows,that Hitler 
was the nweapon construction expert, who met vnth department 
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technicians n. Re gave criticisms not to Gust2.v, but to the 
firms chief technician in charge of gun design, Erich Muelle~ 
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Even the new Krupp, Alfreid(l907-67) was ignored. This era 
showed the Krup_ps in a new position in regards to promoting 
mil itarism . The industrialist had all but disappeared in the 
chain of regnitive vower . No longer did he_ manipulate the 
ruler or the Army . 
It is evident that Krupp Joined Hitler like mzlny other 
Germans under force of threats and under the impact of seduc~ 
tive promises . - Since a -totalitarian state turns its unpolit-
' 
itisch people into accomplices unless they choose to resist, 
/ 
Krupp became an accomplice. When Germany was defeated so 
was Krupp. 
So it was that in 1945 whBn the Allies entered Essen 
Britain's Ernes i:; Douglas Fowlers , who was put in char~ of the 
Ruhr zone, declared, n Not one of these chimneys will ever 
smoke againn. It had been decided by the Big Three at Yalta 
earlier, thaG the defeated foe was to make amends. Stalin 
called for the extermination of hundreds of thousands of 
Germans and the distrubution of Krupp firms. Churchill and 
Roosevelt agreed to the latter, using British Foreign Sec-
retary, Ernest Bevin's statement: 11 If a fellow shot at me 
three times(l870,1914,1939), I don't see why I should give 
him a pistol to make sure the fourth time." Thus the Allies 
formulated Law 27, the breakup of all German cartels as en-
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forced by the Control Co1mission. 
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When the Nuremberg T~als began(l946) to take care of 
crimes perpetrated by Gerr· ans, Gustav Krupp was among the 
names chosen. Because of his age, 74, and senility he could 
not stand trial. These trials ended and the .i-:.merican counseJs 
began a new set in an attempt to convict 1.,he son, Alfried, 
one of the director s of the firm from 1938 •. Evidence mowed 
that Herr Krupp, as chierman of th•. board, 11not onl.:l accepted 
but actively sought to employ concentration camp inmates, 
and for that purpos e, built fa ctories near the camps ~f 
Markstaedt and Auschwitz. Most damning, General Telford Taylor 
U.S. War Crimes Persecutor,established: 
Krupp used the services in 1945 of 55,000 di~ 
placed persons ,18 , 000 prisoners of war, 6,000 
inmates of concentrat-'--on camps 2.s part of TTEx-
termination by WorkPProgram" . ~ 
Krupp u s ed 520 woman slave laborers right in Essen. 
They were between 15 and25 years old, and some 
had been students in Rumania , Hungary and Czecho-
slavakia. 'Their clothing was replaced by a sin-
gle burlap sack. Torn pieces of blankets were 
v,rrap>ed around their legs, and a t times, i nmates 
weref required to walk barefoot in the snow ••• 
After the a.ir raid of December 31, 1944, the a.,_ 
g -rls had to live in a damp cellar . They were Mi-
wakened each morming at 4 a . m. Washing facilities 
were not available. Onl:" one meal was served each 
day ::i..n the camp. Most of the girls were employed 
in Rolling Mill II. Their hair was closely crop ped 
or shaved in the form of a cross.' 4i 
On July 31, 1948, Judge Edwar J Daley of Connecticut h8Dded down 
the following judgement: 
On the counts of the indictment on v.h _;_c h you 
have been convicted Plunder, Deportation, Ex-
ploitation and Abuse of Slave Labor, the tri-
bunal sentenc,5s you to imprisonment for twelve 
years and orders forfe ~ture of al~ yourproperiy. 40 
.. 
The reality of world politics sent Arner~cans to a reex-
amination of the :Krupp case. Between 1947...,.8 the Allies saw 
the rise of a new threat. France was fighting corrm;unism in 
Indo China, Greece,Czechoslavakia and Poland were combatting 
this threat to domest~c peace. Then Russia took over the Krupp 
firms in East Berlin and established a blockade against the 
West. It was evident to many- American observors tha, Germany 
was not economically strong enough to survive a communist 
thrust. So it was that just after the Chines~Comrnun:i:ts en-
tered the Korean War, Alfried and other Kruppian prisoners 
47 
heard their sentences were being reviewed. 
The incredible then happened~ As with Gustav after 
World War I, the pattern of arrest and 'early release was re-
pe&ted in the case of Alfried." On January 30,1951,. U.S. High 
Comn,issioner John Mccloy commuted the sentence to time al-
ready served and restored to Alfried his full properiy rights. " 
Three days later he was released and received by his relative:;, 
"who swamped him with daffodils and carried him off to a cham-
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pagne breakfast~ One reporter asked him whether he would a~ 
gain produce cannons. And Krupp answered, 11 I hope it will 
never again be necessary, but what a factory produces, depends 
not only on the will of the ovmer, but on the politics of its 
49 
government." 
This move enraged the British. They c±ied ttexpediency 11 : 
if the Soviet threat hadn't increased Krupp would be paying 
for his crimes in jail. John 1=cCloy viewed the case from 
another angle, that of American constitutional law. Had Krupp 
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personally stolen anything or maltreated anyone? Mccloy notei: 
Evidence showed that Herr Krupp had committed 
his crimes at a board meeting. That did not 
make him any less culpable, but his guilt was 
that of gross negligence, indifference and 
weakness of character, rather than that of in-
tentional evil. These were the reasons why 
his 12 ~ear sentence was commuted into the 6 
he had already served(since taken into cus-
tody in 1945) . In the states a man can be 
freed after having done one-third his time. 
As for Krupp's property McCloy pointed out that if we wanted 
to seize the works as reparations at the end of the war this 
would have been a legi tir:,ate political decision similar to 
annexation of territory. What was at stake in restorir:g the 
property to KruppTTwas a legal principle : according to Anglo-
s axon traditions , you cannot punish a man for his crimes by 
taking his property awayn. 
Nevertheless the McCloy ruling led ·American diplomats 
in August, 1952 
to offer A an agreement, whereby Krupp was to be compensated 
withf25 million for his coal, iron and steel holdings which 
the Allies had taken. This would get the firm back on the 
road to stability, thereby contributing "to . the defence of 
Europe". 
Once again the British and French viewed the move as a 
violation of Allied Law 27, chich called for the complete 
breakup of German industrial empires and a bar to the return 
to ownership of persons who have furthered the agressive Nazi 
party". They prepared a March, 1953 agreement with Krupp :bo 
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ensure themselves the law would be upheld. By this so-called 
Krupp treaty the firm was to be sliced vertically and horizon-
28 
-
industrialist Axel ;Nenner bought control of BochUJner Vere:in • 
By a private agreement between Bochumer and Krup p firms the 
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Konst o_ntin was returned to Krupp in 1958. As for the other 
mines in the Ruhr complex no offer has met with Krupp de-
mands . One Dutch offer of $2.5 million comes no where near 
its value of $300· million. Thus the 1953 Krupp treaty, as an 
unprecedented commercial . treaty between a private individual 
and three sovereign powers, proved an immediate failure. 11It 
showed the now internationally acceJ ted uniqueness of the 
55 . 
House of Krupp. 11 It was evident the restrictions of the a-
greement were as unenforceable as similar attempts against 
the Krupps after World War I. 
In the meantime Kru~ p had surveyed his property in 1951 
and f ound one third of his steel works had been destroyed by 
bombings and much had been dismantled by the conquering Russ:ian 
armies. He found it would take a half bill ion dollars to re-
tore the company to its lfi43 conditions. Gener al tax credits 
by the German gove1 nr..,ent supplied a good part of the funds. 
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Krupp workers bought shares so as to help. Alfried chose 
Berthold Beitz in 1954 a manager. ttQnly 39, he was one of the 
energetic, shirt-sleeved young men, who ca; e to the top of 
Ger_ an business after the war•" he was called ttthe Arnerican11 




While the Allies wisely ps rmitted the revival of Ruhr 
steelmaking, Beitz carried it out. He wrought for hrupp and ,7 vo.,~1.,1.e., 
7. 
tally to eliminate any possibility of reestablishing mil- I 
I 
.1taristic trade. Under the terms of the accord Krupp pledged 
to sell his entire coal, steel and iron assets before 1960. 
He cound never reinvest in these commoditi~s. nrn return the 
A.llies lifted all controls on the other branches of his in-
dustrial empire, including shipyards , locamotive plants , and 
an array of other companiesU The deal left Krupp, with $140 
million, making him once again one of the richest men in 
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Europe. 
f\ The British and French were convinc84 his s.J..gnature would~, 
legally am:.. morally binding ~ But Krupp had his lav,yer s sign<J,,,1 
He felt he was not at all bound by a pledge which had been 
extorted under duress - threat of losing his fortune. His 
. i;-3 
lawyers pointed out.this violated the moral code. Second, the 
promistjnever aga~n to.engage in steelmaking violated thee-
Si.J. 
quality of citizens before the law. 'Further, the Federal 
Constitution written by the Allies granted every West Germc,n 
the right to enter any occupation. Therefore the Gennan 
government stated it could not withhold Alfried from under-
ts.king business dealings in coal and steel~ Third, the pro-
" 
mise to sell the major steel plant at Rheinhausen and all 
coal mines viii thin five years at a reasonable price proved 
ambiguous. Krupp could discourage prospective purchasers on 
1~'1 
the claim that the price was not right. Take for example the 
Konstantin mine which was bought in 1956 by Bochumer Verein, 
a Ruhr steel .firm. Secretly, an old Krupp friend, Swedish 
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Germany an Econo.,.ic Miracle or Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950 ts .. 
The House obtained immense returns from German an~CSC markets,('? 
By 1961 Krupp held 40% of West Germany J s market in power sho-. 
vels, 36% of the share in electric locomotives, :53% in air-
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plane manuf,acfure, 12% in cranes. His wares included bridges, 
diesel engin,2s, ships , honey, stainless steel teeth. Less th-c.Y\ 
$30 million of the firmts $1.3 billion in sales in 1962 re-
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sulted from military production of radar, trucks and aircraft. 
t'lt,()- !ri;) 
In the same decade Beitz had moved Krupp again outside 
the Eur.opean mar.kerJ_. He aimed at aiding underdeveloped na-
tions. He organized fantastic deals: Brazil gained a major 
machine shop industry; Columbia'built fourteen span brigges.; 
steel mills p9pped up in India, Pakistan, Brazil; Guinea was 
aided in developing a harbor; Syria received he]f)Jn i1anning , 
a dam end Greece in building an oil refinery. In a matter of 
years the House of Kru1: p had invested $250 million in 22· under-
, 60 
develop$~Qcountries. It was an investment reaping admiration 
\ 
from worlr:i powers as well as profits. 
Beitz' tremendous achievement was permission from the 
/ 
Russian government to open a Krupy office in Moscmv- no otherf,Vr¥l 
so1:tfr!If1 in the West has been able to do so. With exports at 
$200 million in 1962 trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to 
$7 million. The market,says Beitz;could be expanded ten fold, 
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thereby imprmving diplomatic relations.n 
Then came the idea f' or an agreement ·,Ji th Po J.and. n I t:hirk 
we owe it to Poland to help them build their ··country again, n 
remarked Beitz. In 198-5 an industrial complex manned W the 
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Poles but " anaged by the Krup:'s, was establ i shed. A ~upp 
team of 250 trained the workers. The Polish governmeb.t was 
then to chose which of the 3000 i ndustrial products from the 
Kr upp catalogue they wished to produce. Krupp eq_uir ment and 
manageLent coupled with Polish builciings and staff. The part-
ners r~ould s :r:,ilt profits from sale s of peaceful products. 
T-his idea of 11 co-production" looks like an ingeni( us way for 
Krupp to expand business v1ith Communist countries. Such deals 
could be a move toward a new foreign policy for Germany. 
·wi.th agreements as suring wages, housing ana quasi-diplomatic 
privileges for Krupp managee s in communist countries, there 
will have to be a revocation of the Hallstein Doctrine. Accord-
ing to this document West Ger .. any will not recognize any 
country(except Russia) tha t has diplomatic relations with 
East Germany- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslavakia, Rumania, Bulgat'-
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ia, Yugoslavia . The House of Krupp aims to eliminate the 
the militaristic fears tha t all s tates are .natural enemies 
by edonomic intercourse. 
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Part III ~he Krupp Trauma 
Pursuit of trade with the Soviet bloc leads one to 
surmise apossible reactionary movement of the House of Krupp. 
In 1869 Alfred Krupp refused to let Wilhe1mI halt his sales 
to Napolean III and other enemies of Germany ready to attack 
it. In 1959 Alfried Krupp refused to let German Chancellor 
fl Adenauer halt his sales to Kru~chevand other enemies of demo-
cracy and freedom. Norbert Muhlen contends this unpolitisch 
businesss is shortsighted in regard to responsibility to the 
63 
world community to oppose the communist threat. It is as 
Oswald Spengler points out, 11Creative humans Yvho build cul-
tures are eventually replaced by manipulators who ,in the 
name of profits push toward concentrations of power'~ which 
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destroy the culture. Peter Batty backs up this statement 
vd th some facts. "When Krup.f.! was sentenced at Nuremberg in 
· July, 1948 he became penniless; almost twenty years later he 
was a multi-millionaire, with a spendable income each year of 
7 digits~ Krupp had prospered even at Germany's loss. It was as 
Leon Blum used to say, "The graatest industrialists of Europe 
are the only ones to survive the cataclysms that periodically 
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shake the continent." 
The crux of the issuB lies in the means Krupp has used 
to regain his position. Has there been a rehabilitating trend 
) 
through the production of peaceful goods? Statistics show that 
' 
of the 30 divisions of Krupp, coal and steel are produced in 
amounts equal co only 30% of the company's total business. 
These products are used at the Krupp shipyards(including Ger:..a 
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many's second l argest) and to supply the Federal Railway 
vii th locomotives. .jirupp also employed his products in the 
Flugtechnische Werke in Bremen, which accounts for on2 third 
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of German aviation production, and is 40% Krupp owned. 
Krupp is not rearming Germany at the present time. 
Many observors fear for the future. The Krupps have 
never relinquished their immense power over the people of 
the Ruhr, the German government or their Armed Forces. nrndus-
tialist power is still concentrated in the hand o of a fe~) 
says Thor: as Prittie, and thus retains the"arrogance of Germany-Ts 
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past'~ This is evident by the skilful operations of Krupp and 
others in regard to the Allied Law 27. Then too consider how 
Krupp has avoided compliance v.rith the 15 year old Allied order 
to sell coal and steel properties. As the news magazine, Der 
Spiegel asserted in an article about Krupp,February 28, 1968, 
f!German industry deemed it a mc.tter of honor not to bid for 
Krupp holdings!!. The Fred Krupp GmbH corporation formed in 
JanuE~ry, 1968, from the s pr a.wling Krupp family holdings con-
sidered the Allied order of 1953 invalid. West Germany as a 
re. ember of the EEC and ESC must concentrate production into 
larger and more efficent units. The divestment order would 
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be contrary to the decision of the Common Market organization. v 
Will the Besurgent Germany then start/to manufacture 
munitions, although Krupp himself has voluntarily pledged not 
to? Will West Germany's alliance with the West against Russi a 
change the situation? Is the U.S. powerless to enforce the 
1953 order because of t~e-ups in Vietnam? Or do the present 
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trends ~n the Ruhr portend the building of a fervent de-
fender of Europe? 
Today Germans still wan~ supremacy of their country as 
a European power. But the end to the goal no longer seems 
to be tbrough "tools of war". Muhlen claims there are several 
reasons. The first is psychological. Since the arms trade 
has so often plunged Germany into the horrors of world war, 
the people are not anxious to repeat the experience. The 
second is rational. Germans see their new status as a second 
rate power under tbree giants, Russian, China and thf .s. 
She must join with her neighbors to provide a bulwark for 
EuropeBn power. The youth of Germany ~ave grown up in this 
new era and seem to be awake to their responsibilitie:,as 
{oLf 
meLbers of the Wes tern community. 
But the Krupps vvill also have their say. Are thw as 
strong as in past generation~? In 1967, the firm in t:ime of 
peace without tremendous arms markets was near bankruptcy. 
Perhaps Beitz was too good a dealer, for he couldn't finance 
what he sold. Manuf&cturing operations were too varied (pre-
fab houses, high~temperature reactors to wines and false 
teeth), too numerous(3000 products), or too small to be 
profitable. Exportation to underdeveloped countries had in-
volved Krupp in cut...--tbroat competition. Economic Minister 
Karl Schihee and Finance Minister Franz Strauss offered the 
ailing firm $138 million in government and bank credits. Kru1:p 
in return was required to change the firm into a .stare com-
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pany by 1968, and had to publish balance !:,h~e t s for coal and 
steel manufacture. Finally, Alfried Ts thirty year old s on, 
Arndt, renounced the Krupp name and authority in the com-
7.0 
pany in return for a $500,000 a year settlement fro L1 ihe firm. 
Yet after all is said the Krupp saga lives as the phoenix 
amidst universal fear and distrust . Many are suspicious that 
the firrn, which has played a role in the unhappy history of 
our times, will once again invoke the creed of militarism. 
/'- 1 
The men at the top have changed but how can one be sure their 
) 
attitudes have _ likewise changed? The products a re different, 
but are the principles?,, This has been and will be the 
. \ ;. .; _____.. -~- .. 
,,.f_ ~~It . .,..,_.. "\ rl • 1 'r-1 i, Ji I! ~ 1 ~\- >-·j; ,?"J, ,, ""'\ ) if • 
criteria f..ar the House of Krupp in prorribti~.g German mili tarisn • 
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1Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, p. 190. 
see Max Harden the German editor in t .. eNYc Times, N 8 '1916,. 
2Norbert Muhlen, The Incredible Krupps, p.4.5. Fredrich 
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